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Essay review
Fallible or inerrant? A belated review of the ‘constructivist’s bible ’
Jan Golinski, Making Natural Knowledge: Constructivism and the History of Science.
Cambridge History of Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Pp. xiv+236. ISBN 0-521-44913-8. £15.95 (paperback).
When Jan Golinski’sMakingNatural Knowledgewas published in 1998 it was generally
applauded for its ecumenical stance between the empirical ‘art ’ of historians and the
theoretical focus of the social sciences. Indeed, such a middling position was a unique
approach to be taken in wake of the ‘science wars’ and this, in combination with the
book’s clear organization and (for the most part) forthright prose, quickly earned it a
place upon HPS, STS and SSK postgraduate reading lists. Now, ﬁve years since its ﬁrst
editionwas published (hardback, 1998), thework has become a standard introduction to
historically minded scholars interested in the constructivist programme. In fact, it has
been called the ‘constructivist’s bible ’ in many a conference corridor. Since the book has
attained such a status (and since it has not been reviewed in theBJHS), it is perhapsworth
reﬂecting on whether or not such canonical text (to use a biblical analogy) is fallible or
inerrant – especially in relation to its content and pedagogical eﬃcacy.
Claims and content
A quick search for Making Natural Knowledge on any social sciences reference index
(or any other humanities database for that matter) is guaranteed to turn up a substantial
amount of works that cite the book. If one takes the time to pursue these citations, it
becomes quite clear that the book, for better or for worse, has become a rhetorical
commonplace for scholarswishing to pay a footnote to the constructivist position (which
is quite ironic consideringGolinski’s ownworkon science and rhetoric). This, considered
in combinationwith the fact thatmost postgraduate students are often asked to read only
the parts of the book that are relevant to their course, suggests that it is becoming one of
thoseworks that ismore often cited than read. Bearing this inmind, the following section
oﬀers review of the book’s claims and content. For those who are intimately familiar
with the book’s entire scope, such a recap might be all too familiar. If this is the case,
I recommend skipping over the next few paragraphs and turning to the second section
where I address aspects of the book’s pedagogical usefulness.
As stated in the preface, the book is both a work of an uncertain genre and an
‘extended historiographical essay’. Golinski loosely deﬁnes ‘constructivism’ to be a
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‘methodological orientation [rather] than a set of philosophical principles ; it directs
attention systematically to the role of human beings, as social actors, in the making of
scientiﬁc knowledge’ (p. 6). Although he does not give a speciﬁc deﬁnition of what he
means by ‘science’, the very title of the book and his use of the term indicate that he sees
it as the creation and manipulation of natural knowledge. His thesis is that the history
of science can be enhanced by the questions posed by the constructivist programme and
he supports this claim by summarizing an admirable amount of secondary literature.
He contrasts the constructive approach with that of ‘conservative writers ’ (p. 163), a
term used to represent historians who have reservations about applying the sociological
perspectives oﬀered by constructivism. Even though it is not speciﬁcally stated in the
Introduction, a sub-thesis that runs throughout the book is that constructivism can
potentially deliver the history of science from microhistories (studies that concentrate
only on small spans of time) which do not adequately consider the larger social factors
that inﬂuence local scientiﬁc communities. The organization of each chapter is rather
straightforward; he presents one or two constructivist ideas at the beginning and then
seeks to illustrate how they have been (or could be) fruitfully applied to the practice of
writing scientiﬁc history.
As its title indicates, Chapter 1 is ‘An outline of constructivism’ as relevant to the
history of science. Beginning with a largely sociological interpretation of Kuhn’s 1962
The Structure of Scientiﬁc Revolutions, it moves on to explain how Kuhn inspired
Edinburgh’s Strong Programme to investigate the role played by social causation in
scientiﬁc beliefs. It then shows how this programme contributed to the emerging ﬁeld of
the sociology of scientiﬁc knowledge during the late 1970s and how this led to several
diﬀerent forms of sociologically inﬂuenced histories of science during the 1980s and
1990s. Having summarized the emergence and basic tenets of ‘constructivism’, the
remaining chapters seek to demonstrate how this perspective can be applied to ‘mapping
the social proﬁle’ (p. 46) of science via historical studies.
After addressing the initial inﬂuence of RobertMerton’s teleological internal/external
thesis upon early constructivists, Chapter 2 explains how later sociological histories
deconstructed this historiographical typology, thereby paving the way for studies which
addressed how social factors inﬂuence the way inwhich institutions – academies, courts,
universities, laboratories and lecture theatres – foster and then disseminate experimental
knowledge. Having shown the relevance of constructivism to such institutions, Golinski
uses the ﬁrst part of Chapter 3 to focus on the laboratory, a place traditionally considered
to be the epicentre of the scientiﬁc endeavour. His main objective is to demonstrate that
constructivism has shown that laboratories do not exist in a social vacuum. The rest of
the chapter goes on to summarize historical studies which have investigated how social
factors are involved in validating the natural knowledge generated by laboratories,
museums and ﬁeldwork sites.
Chapter 4 treats scientiﬁc discourse; that is, the use of rhetoric and hermeneutics to
communicate natural knowledge. The ﬁrst half advances a claim which was initially
developed in his Science as Public Culture (1992), namely that rhetorical analysis (in the
classical sense) can be used by historians to investigate how convention, audience, situ-
ation and form inﬂuence the reception and exchange of natural knowledge. The second
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halfof thechapteraddresseshermeneutics,whichGolinskideﬁnes tobeanendeavour that
‘ is concerned with howmeaning is constructed by the interpreters of discourse ’ (p. 120).
This is evidently his own deﬁnition and although it harmonizes with the goal of his book,
it does leave one towonder if it is nuanced enough to include the hermeneutical positions
of several of thephilosopherswhoare subsequently cited – Gadamer,Heidegger,Ricoeur
and Wittgenstein, for example. Based on his conception of hermeneutics, Golinski ad-
vances three ‘categories of analysis ’ (semantic, semiotic and narratological) (p. 127) and
then proceeds to cite studies which have used such a methodology.
Building onChapter 3’s treatment of experimental knowledge andChapter 4’s interest
in how scientiﬁc ideas are communicated, Chapter 5 turns to instruments and visual
images that have been traditionally associated with the laboratory. Golinski’s treatment
of instruments emphasizes that they are constructed objects and as such are only as
infallible as their users. Furthermore, their correct usage and the interpretation of their
results often depends on tacit forms of knowledge that can only be taught in a local
setting. This issue of interpretation then leads into the second part of the chapterwhere he
discusses the visual rhetoric and hermeneutics of scientiﬁc images (p. 146). He suggests
that these can be studied empirically in relation to how setting, function and technology
contributed to their formation and reception.
After a brief recap of the book’s goals, Chapter 6 addresses a concept that has become
very popular in the social sciences over the past twodecades: culture.Golinski once again
challenges unnamed ‘conservative writers ’ by asserting that the social focus of the
constructivist gaze oﬀers a new concept of culture that is not fettered to an overt
dedication to intellectual history. By looking at science from this wider perspective, he
believes that thiswill encourage studies that concentrate on cultural networks rather than
on scientiﬁc localities – a development that would bring scholars one step closer to
crafting the macrohistories of science mentioned earlier in the book. To illustrate the
applicability of this claim, he spends the rest of the chapter discussing metrology; that is,
the study of how measurements become standardized in diﬀerent locations. Building on
the constructivist emphasis upon the inherently social nature of scientiﬁc networks,
he cites several events in the history of metrology which demonstrate that the road
to standardization has not been a smooth one. This interest in studies which look at
the larger role of science in society sets the stage for the coda where he discusses ‘the
obligations of narrative’. He returns once again to his contention that most historians
of science are currently interested in writing microhistories. He suggests that con-
structivism’s focus on larger social factors has paved the way for a ‘new vision’ that is
interested in ‘the re-emergence of big-picture narratives, albeit of a rather diﬀerent kind
from the traditional stories of progressive epistemological accomplishment’ (p. 189). The
rest of the coda explores this position as evinced in several studies that have used socially
oriented historical narratives as an approach to the history of science.
Pedagogical considerations
As the above summary indicates, this book covers quite a bit of intellectual territory. For
those ‘conservative’ thinkers who are not familiar with SSK or with how sociological
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methodologies have been generally applied to the history of science, this is a relatively
short book (206 pages) which gives a helpful introduction to a historiographical genre
that has generated a signiﬁcant amount of jargon and secondary material over the past
three decades. As can be imagined, the historical studies of Shapin, Bloor and Latour
receive considerable attention. For those who are familiar with these authors, some of
the summaries of their positions might seem a bit verbose or even contentious. In fact,
Golinski’s portrayal of the Strong Programme has raised the eyebrows of both historians
and sociologists of science ;1 and for a book that is often used to introduce students to SSK
studies, this seems rather problematic. Additionally, Golinski’s penchant for throwing
around the names of a good many twentieth-century philosophers has often confused
more than helped the students who take my undergraduate history of science modules.
This diﬃculty is usually not a problem for postgraduates, because most of them realize
thatGolinski generally uses a philosopher’s name to represent a certain type of thought or
idea as construed by constructivists – so the philosophical content is not as complicated
for students willing to use a basic philosophical dictionary.
Despite these and other shortcomings, the book has proven to be rather resilient over
the past ﬁve years. This is because it ﬁlls the notable gap that still exists between how
‘science ’ is represented by theoretically centred sociological approaches and by themore
empirically focused historical enterprise (incidentally, the trendy sociological term now
used to identify the former practice is ‘ trace’ work). Interestingly, most of the citations
paid toMakingNatural Knowledge in recent books occur inworks that are being pitched
at readers who are not prepared or able to wade into the unpredictable (and often in-
conveniently located) wilds of archival collections (particularly the pre-1800 European-
based collections that are painfully inaccessible for a great many North American and
Australian researchers). This being the case, it is quite easy to see why the book so often
occurs on the syllabi of social science courses which are more interested in the larger
narratives of history than the ﬁne speciﬁcs of archival work.
Yet, no matter what one thinks of Golinski’s blend of sociology and history, it is
generally acknowledged that one of the most pressing methodological ambiguities of the
book is its rather loose conception of ‘constructivism’. Golinski has no problem in-
cluding philosophically, socially or culturally minded authors who might not wish to be
placed in the constructivist tradition – Kuhn being the most obvious example. He de-
fends this methodological egalitarianism by stating that constructivist ideas have pro-
vided a theoretical rationale for the studies he has chosen to cite and that this method
oﬀers ‘the prospect of connecting empirical local studies with more general themes
concerning the constitution of scientiﬁc knowledge’ (p. 80). Fair enough for thosewilling
to accept such a position. However, for the more methodologically (or perhaps ped-
antically) inclined historians of science out there, Golinski’s forthright justiﬁcationmight
not be as satisfying. This is because he cites an incredible amount of case studies taken
1 Thiswas pointed out in the initial reviews of the book. For the historical perspective, see JohnHenry, ‘Calls
for a ceaseﬁre in the science wars’,Nature (1998), 395, 557–8; for a sociological analysis, see Ingemar Bohlin,
‘Making history’, Social Studies of Science (1999), 29, 459–80.
96 M. D. Eddy
from secondary sources. These are most often grouped around the thematic foci of the
chapters as summarized above. Although this allows him to give a general structure to the
book, such a practice is pedagogically problematic.
First, it allows him to skip over the methodological commitments that led to the
conclusions of the very case studies that he is citing. When one digs below these con-
clusions, it becomes apparent that some of their methodologies are incompatible with
each other – and as the ﬁrst chapter of the book so clearly demonstrates, there are many
diﬀerent methodological variants within constructivism alone and this often inﬂuences
how the historical data is arranged. Second, Golinski’s thematic arrangement allows him
to sidestep the fact that the data used in many of his case studies is of a radically diﬀerent
nature, both in terms of where it came from and when it was gathered or created. This is
especially problematic when he uses a constructivist theme (sociological questions about
the laboratory, for example) to categorize case studies selected fromboth themodern and
the earlymodern periods (p. 86). Such a practice does not seem to recognize that there is a
diﬀerence between the source materials of a study conducted on living physicists (who
can be queried and where primary documents have not been destroyed and are therefore
more abundant) and one conducted on the founders of the Royal Society (who are dead
and whose personal notebooks and correspondence have often been lost). These two
methodological concerns are signiﬁcant and although they are obvious to professional
historians, they are not so easily spotted by students.
Even though the book is concerned with demonstrating how the constructivist per-
spective provides newquestions that can be asked of the history of science, it is interesting
to note that it is relatively silent on how industrious students can use constructivism to
unearth new and diverse primary sources that might help them see pre-1900 science from
a more social or culturally nuanced angle – a particularly perplexing point for a book
interested in addressing scientiﬁc historiography. True, Golinski is calling for a new
approach to primary sources that have been used for centuries. But thismeans that he has
to rely implicitly on a scientiﬁc canon that was largely determined by nineteenth-century
historians who were content to eliminate sources that many of today’s constructivists
would be quite interested in embracing. Because he relies on this traditional canon, the
majority of his case studies are based upon sources that were originally selected because
of their relevance to institutions like the Royal Society or the ‘great men’ of science like
Copernicus, Galileo, Bacon, Boyle, Hooke, Newton, Lavoisier, Banks, Davy, Faraday
and Darwin. By focusing on these men, the very case studies that Golinski uses to
propound the relevance of constructivism end up implicitly supporting the conservative
position that he is trying to challenge. This being the case, it would seem that one of the
crucial goals for the book should have been to suggest how constructivism could be used
to reconﬁgure the scientiﬁc canon so that the same people and ideas are not constantly
reaﬃrmed by an older historiographical position. Such an approach would provide
constructivism with a stronger foundation from which it could re-evaluate the his-
toriographical representation of scientiﬁc ideas, cultures and episodes. It would also
allow it to draw from several philosophical (or perhaps ideological) traditions that
Golinski only treats in a cursory manner. A case in point is feminism. Instead of re-
aﬃrming that the role of women in science has been ignored (p. 91), he could have used
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feminist approaches to unearth documents which showed that women actually were
proactive agents in the scientiﬁc enterprise.
The book’s format also presents two points worthy of consideration. The ﬁrst is that
Golinski uses internal notation. This oﬀers an aesthetic advantage because it removes the
distraction that footnotes often create. However, should a more advanced student want
to look up a given text or case study, this system presents diﬃculties because it usually
does not provide speciﬁc page numbers. This problem becomes particularly acute in
places where the methodological issues mentioned above are at stake. Second, although
the thematic arrangement of the book provides a clear overarching structure, the internal
organization of each chapter’s two or three subsections is sometimes hard to follow, even
for a specialist, let alone a student. Golinski’s most common method for presenting
constructivist ideas is by summarizing the views of another author who has written on a
given subject. This is advantageous because it helps the reader to map the many diﬀerent
positions represented by the constructivist terrain. Nevertheless, this approach does
become confusing in places.Many of the summaries could pass as in-depth book reviews
in which Golinski does not clearly indicate where a given author’s position ends and
where his reﬂections begin. Additionally, some of these summaries turn into a dizzying
list of secondary sources without explaining their precise relevance to the thematic goal
of a given subsection – hardly a desirable trait in a textbook. Furthermore, even though
he does criticize several authors, Golinski, for the most part, seems to accept the ques-
tions posed by constructivism without necessarily accepting the methods that it uses to
answer them.
So, in light of the pedagogical ‘ fallibilities ’ mentioned in this essay, is the con-
structivist’s bible useful as a textbook for historians of science? I would venture a
cautionary response in the aﬃrmative. Asking postgraduate students to read summaries
of historiographical positions should not replace the need for them to read primary texts
themselves. This being the case, although it glosses the positions of several sociological
authors, and despite the fact that its index and bibliography are far from being exhaus-
tive, most readers will ﬁnd that the book still makes for a helpful reference work –
especially for the more historically minded courses that take constructivism as a point of
departure. Additionally, I have found that the book provides a helpful focal point for
seminars or tutorials interested in exploring the advantages and tensions that arise when
a historian attempts to apply a given constructivist approach to a speciﬁc time period or
diﬀerent types of data – a deconstruction of constructivism, if you will. I do this with the
realization that, just like the laboratory instruments thatGolinski discusses, the reception
and use of the book is ultimately couched within the tacit knowledge communicated to
the student via the larger community in which s/he is studying. Even so, time has shown
that within the wide variety of environments interested in teaching various aspects of the
history of science, the book’s diﬃculties have not prevented it frombeing a pedagogically
useful text.
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